Economic surveillance and coordination mechanisms won’t work without proper scrutiny by national parliaments by Kreilinger, Valentin
Debate on the European Semester in the EP
3/23/2016
Economic surveillance and coordination mechanisms won’t work
without proper scrutiny by national parliaments
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/03/23/economic-surveillance-and-coordination-mechanisms-wont-work-without-proper-scrutiny-by-national-parliaments/
The principle of strengthening national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process has attracted
substantial attention in recent years. Perhaps more important, however, is their role in economic
governance. After the European Council of 17-18 March endorsed the policy priority areas of the
Annual Growth Survey, Valentin Kreilinger writes that national parliaments can play a key role in
scrutinising the economic policy surveillance and coordination of the so called ‘European
Semester’.
The economic and ﬁnancial crisis has exposed the failure of the original Maastricht settlement with
its weak controls over national ﬁscal and economic policies. In reaction to the crisis, a wide range of measures to
strengthen coordination and surveillance have been adopted.
But the Economic and Monetary Union is not viable in its current form because member states have not suﬃciently
oriented their ﬁscal and economic policies to the requirements of the monetary union. They don’t comply with
numerical rules just because they entered contractual agreements. Ownership has been a buzzword of economic
governance for a long time, but it still captures the heart of the problem: National governments and parliaments do
not see recommendations from European coordination and surveillance mechanisms as ‘theirs’.
Despite the creation and the strengthening of the
European Semester, the EU’s yearly cycle of
economic policy coordination, acceptance of the
common rules and compliance of member states with
coordination and surveillance mechanisms are still
too low. Involving national parliaments has been
acknowledged as important for ensuring legitimacy,
ownership and accountability in the Economic and
Monetary Union: In June 2015, the Five Presidents’
Report explicitly called for a ‘renewed’ and ‘more
integrated’ European Semester.
Most national parliaments scrutinise the European
Semester’s Stability and Convergence Programmes
and National Reform Programmes that their
governments have to submit to the European
Commission by 30 April each year. Hearings with
European Commissioners also take place in national
parliaments.
But just like elsewhere in the European Semester, such as in terms of parliamentary scrutiny procedures and
progress on the implementation of their Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations, member states have varying
performance records. Using data on prerogatives in the European Semester and on the implementation record of
Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations, it is possible to assess member states’ adaptation to the European Semester:
Denmark is the clear frontrunner, while a group of six member states (Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia) is lagging behind.
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Table: National adaptation to the European Semester
Source: Valentin Kreilinger, National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and ownership in
the Euro Area, Studies and Reports n°110, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, March 2016, p. 8,
based on data by Deroose and Griesse (2014) and Rittberger and Winzen (2015).
Public opinion is more favourable towards the coordination of economic policies than commonly assumed: In those
countries that had a low implementation record for Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations and whose national
parliaments did not obtain new prerogatives in the European Semester, citizens were particularly in favour of a
preliminary consultation between EU institutions and national political institutions in the drafting process of national
budgets (72 per cent in these six countries against 65 per cent among all member states, according to the 2012
European Parliament Eurobarometer survey).
In a broader perspective, the governance structures, decisions and recommendations associated with the common
currency are suﬀering from a legitimacy deﬁcit. This relates to emergency measures, like providing ﬁnancial
guarantees and support to individual member states whose currency is the euro, as well as to the severe
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conditionality tied to these rescue packages: Only a few national parliaments, such as the German Bundestag, have
robust veto powers, others have not – the national parliaments of countries that had to sign a ‘Memorandum of
Understanding’ often ﬁnd their role reduced to rubber-stamping austerity measures.
A major overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union is needed and should consist of a package that contains
more division of sovereignty, more risk sharing and more democracy. Transferring, sharing or pooling sovereignty is
the problem for some countries – more risk sharing is the problem for others. And while, in principle, nobody objects
to more democracy, there is no agreement on the precise steps to be taken to organise better democratic control of
the Economic and Monetary Union and alleviate the legitimacy deﬁcit.
Parliamentary scrutiny of the day-to-day coordination and surveillance of ﬁscal and economic policies could address
the problem that adaptation of national parliaments to the stronger surveillance and coordination mechanisms in the
Economic and Monetary Union has so far only happened in an asymmetric way. Properly involving parliaments in
order to address the lack of national ownership in the coordination and surveillance procedures should become a
key element in the institutional dimension of completing the Economic and Monetary Union.
Such a strengthening of parliamentary scrutiny could happen at the national and the European level (national
parliamentary scrutiny over national governments; the European Parliament’s scrutiny over the European
Commission), but cross-level scrutiny (e.g. more hearings of EU Commissioners in national parliaments; and more
hearings of national ministers in the European Parliament) or inter-parliamentary scrutiny (joint scrutiny by national
parliaments and the European Parliament over the executives) should also take place more often.
The author has recently published a paper on this topic: “National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and
ownership in the Euro Area” (Studies and Reports n°110, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, March 2016).
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